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ABSTRACT 
In their current haste to deliver, the Doha negotiators seem to head for a package combining 
increased market access for “easy” products (mostly those with low or moderate tariffs) with broad 
exceptions in “difficult” sectors (mostly those with high tariffs).  Such a mix may increase the chances 
of getting a deal, but it is certain to deliver a disappointing economic outcome, with very limited welfare 
gains for the consumers and additional market access for the exporters. 
The paper presents alternatives to the current proposals that would increase economic gains and 
would provide wider political support.  As the alternatives are detailed enough to give a concrete 
sense of the issues at stake and of the outcomes within reach, the paper can be read in two ways.  If 
the ongoing negotiations fail within the next weeks, these alternatives offer fresh options.  If they lead 
to a deal within the next months, the alternatives offer a benchmark assessing the value of the Doha 
outcome that would have been achieved. 
In the Doha negotiations on industrial goods, the alternatives are based on the target proposed by the 
European business (not by the Commission) – no single industrial tariff above 15 percent – because it 
makes a lot of sense.  It would eliminate tariff peaks, hence deliver the bulk of the welfare gains to 
consumers.  It would vastly increase the certainty of access to the emerging countries’ markets, a 
critical outcome for businesses.  Last but not least, it would not impose a brutal liberalisation on 
developing economies, making easier to negotiate simple and predictable exceptions, hence 
generating a “clean” Doha Agreement. 
In the Doha negotiations in “agriculture”, the alternatives address the deadlock of the EC tariff cuts by 
making use of a little known but crucial fact – that the negotiations deal with many more agro-industrial 
(“food”) products than farm products.  “Rebalancing” the current EC tariff proposal – cutting more the 
high tariffs, cutting less the low tariffs – is an attractive alternative.  Cutting deeper into the high tariffs 
would greatly improve the economic welfare gains of the European consumers.  Cutting less the low 
tariffs would deliver political benefits by offering the EC farmers and a vast majority of EC food 
producers a better “deal” than the current proposal. 
Last but not least, the alternatives presented would better fit the two key criteria imposed on the Doha 
Round – the “less than full reciprocity” for the emerging economies, and a “comparably high level of 
ambition in market access for Agriculture and NAMA” – than the current proposals. 
Keywords: Doha Round, WTO, Agriculture, NAMA. 
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The Doha Negotiations on Trade in Goods: 
At a Crossroads 
Patrick MESSERLIN1
INTRODUCTION 
The Doha Round is at this crucial juncture where it has to decide the critical trade-offs between 
increased market access and politically needed exceptions (called “flexibilities” in the Doha jargon).  In 
their current haste to deliver, the Doha negotiators seem to head for a package combining increased 
market access for “easy” products (those with initially low or moderate tariffs) with a host of arcane 
exceptions in “difficult” sectors (those with high tariffs, that is, precisely those which require additional 
competition). 
Such a mix may increase the chances of getting a deal.  But it is certain to deliver a disappointing 
economic outcome:  consumers’ welfare is increased mostly by cutting high tariffs, and exporters find 
little comfort in the dismantlement of low tariffs, while the remaining high tariffs will be frozen until the 
next Round.  An economically mediocre outcome behind an apparent diplomatic success is doomed to 
have a heavy political price in most WTO Members.  Anti-globalizers and protectionists of all kinds will 
claim that every costly event occurring in the domestic economies after the Round completion is 
caused by a liberalisation that never happened (as it has been the case in agriculture after the 
Uruguay Round).  That would give a new blow to the WTO reputation. 
The paper reviews the Doha negotiations on trade in goods.  It also presents alternatives to the 
current proposals that would increase economic gains and enjoy wider political support.  As the 
alternatives presented are detailed enough to give a concrete sense of the issues at stake and of the 
outcomes within reach, the paper can be read in two ways.  If the ongoing negotiations fail within the 
next weeks, or if they spark off a last minute rethinking, the alternatives presented in the paper offer 
fresh options.  If the current negotiations lead to a deal within the next months, the alternatives offer a 
benchmark assessing the value of the Doha outcome that would have been achieved. 
I. Two Key Conditions for a Doha Outcome 
The Doha mandate imposes two key conditions on any outcome of the Round.  Firstly, paragraph 16 
of the 2001 Doha Declaration reads:  “The negotiations shall take fully into account the special needs 
and interests of developing and least-developed country participants, including through less than full 
reciprocity in reduction commitments [..]”.  An outcome that does not meet the “less than full 
reciprocity” has no chance to fly, even though this condition does not make much economic sense (it 
can easily be detrimental to developing countries’ interests).  But, the developing countries are 
adamant on such a provision because they see it as the last, minimal, expression of the 
“development” dimension of the Doha Round.  Hence, the alternatives proposed in the paper abide by 
this condition, while trying to minimize its negative potential impact on the emerging and developing 
countries. 
The second condition is embodied in paragraph 24 of the 2005 Hong Kong Declaration that reads:  
“[..] we instruct our negotiators to ensure that there is a comparably high level of ambition in market 
access for Agriculture and NAMA.”  This statement is expressed in terms of goods (contrary to the 
previous one) but it also has a country dimension since it requires de facto some “parallelism” 
between the liberalisation of the industrial markets of the emerging countries and the liberalisation of 
the advanced economies’ agricultural markets.  This second criterion is economically neutral.  It could 
                                                 
1 /Professor of economics, Sciences Po, and Director of Groupe d’Economie Mondiale at Sciences Po (GEM).  I would like to 
thank very much Alan Matthews for very helpful comments and criticisms.  A shorter version of this paper focusing more on the 
EC is available [Messerlin 2007a]. 
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deliver economic gains if it fuels a virtuous circle of substantial liberalization by the two groups of 
countries.  It would harmful if it pushes both groups of countries into a vicious circle of limiting the 
liberalisation scope and/or magnitude. 
 
II. An Integrated View of the Doha Negotiations in Goods 
The Doha negotiations in goods are held in two fora – one focusing on “agriculture” (a term scrutinized 
below, in section 4) and another one focusing on industrial products (called “non-agricultural market 
access” in the Doha jargon, or NAMA).  Although every negotiator is aware of the links between these 
two tracks, this negotiating structure makes more difficult a fully integrated view of the negotiations by 
hiding two remarkable symmetries. 
The first symmetry flows from the liberalisation efforts that most WTO Members have undertaken 
since the last Round.  During the two last decades, many developing countries have cut their applied 
tariffs on industrial products (unilaterally or in accordance with their Uruguay Round commitments).  
But they did not bind them at their new applied levels – hence generating a huge “tariff water” (the 
difference between the bound and applied tariffs). 2/  Meanwhile, the advanced economies are 
showing a huge “support water” in agriculture, that is, a difference between their Uruguay Round 
commitments on farm subsidies and their current farm support.  Arguably, this farm support water is 
more the consequence of Uruguay commitments “generous” for OECD farmers and/or of recent world 
price increases than the effect of real cuts in OECD farm support.  But, the fact is that this huge 
support water does exist. 
These two huge, symmetrical “waters” are what makes the Doha Round so different from the previous 
ones. 3/  Firstly, their sheer magnitude means that simply eliminating them has a huge intrinsic 
economic value in terms of certainty of the existing trade flows in goods – a point that the Doha 
negotiators tend to undervalue while the business community is heavily insisting on it.  In other words, 
even if the cuts in bound industrial tariffs and in farm support to be decided by the Doha negotiators 
are short to cut (on average) the current applied industrial tariffs and farm support, these cuts will have 
– more than in any previous Round – a strongly positive impact on trade in goods.  Secondly, these 
symmetrical “waters” look an useful basis for a reasoned and balanced approach that is so cruelly 
missing in the ongoing negotiations.  If the advanced economies’ negotiators want to “cut flesh” in the 
industrial tariffs of the emerging countries (that is, to get bound tariffs lower than the current tariffs 
applied by these economies in order to generate “new trade flows”) they should be ready to “cut flesh” 
in their farm support and in their agricultural tariffs since tariffs are the best instrument for disciplining 
subsidies [Snape 1991].  Of course, a symmetrical statement could be made for the emerging 
countries’ negotiators. 
The Doha Round has a second symmetry that could be remarkably useful.  The peak bound tariffs of 
the nine major emerging countries in manufacturing are roughly of the same magnitude (400 percent) 
than the peak tariffs of the U.S. and the EC in agriculture (when including the ad valorem equivalent of 
the specific duties).  Focusing on the peak tariffs is essential from an economic point of view because 
most welfare gains will flow from cuts in the high tariffs.  (By contrast, WTO negotiators unfortunately 
focus on tariff and tariff cut averages that say little on the tariff structures, hence are unable to shed 
some light on the true economic impact of the Round.)  The paper uses these almost similar peak 
tariffs for defining balanced cuts of the highest tariffs for the two main groups of goods (hence for the 
two main groups of WTO Members). 
 
                                                 
2 /WTO tariff negotiations deal exclusively with bound tariffs because they are the only ones that cannot be raised without 
compensating the affected trading partners, hence that deliver legal certainty in market access. 
3  /Out of the 143 WTO Members on which there is available information, 104 Members enforce applied tariffs lower than their 
bound tariffs, with 70 of them having an average tariff water higher than 10 percent.  In some cases, tariff water can reach 
impressing average level (about 100 percent) [WTO 2006].  Out of these 70 countries, 21 can be classified as emerging 
economies, the rest being developing countries [Messerlin 2007]. 
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III. The NAMA Negotiations 
NAMA negotiators cover all the industrial sectors, except the food industries which are part of the 
negotiations in “agriculture”.  Their failure to define exceptions in such a way that negotiators could 
easily predict their impact on the final balance of concessions of their country and its trading partners 
is one of the key reasons for the suspension of the Doha negotiations in July 2006. 
The December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial did make a giant step in improving the market access 
negotiating process by adopting the “Swiss formula” as the instrument for negotiating tariff cuts. 4/  
The Swiss formula is an extremely efficient instrument from a negotiating point of view (it is the 
simplest possible negotiating method since it consists in agreeing on one figure, namely the Swiss 
coefficient) from an economic perspective (it cuts high tariffs by more than small tariffs, hence it grabs 
most of the welfare gains to be expected from liberalisation, while still making possible to stabilize or 
even to increase tariff revenues) and from a domestic political point of view (it keeps unchanged the 
pre-liberalisation ranking of tariffs, hence it does not trigger fights among domestic vested interests).  
Last but not least in the Doha Round, all these features make the Swiss formula the ideal instrument 
for taking into account the wide differences in the development level among the WTO Members 
without being forced to go through the process of defining different groups of developing countries 
(such a process has almost no chance to be successful in the current WTO forum). 
That said, there is an unavoidable need for exceptions to a base formula in a forum with so many and 
so diverse Members as the WTO). 5/  The Hong Kong Ministerial was unable to define the exceptions 
more clearly than the 2004 Framework Agreement – hence amounting to void the Swiss formula of 
any substance not only because the coverage of the exceptions has often been left open, but also 
because the magnitude of the exceptions can be huge. 
Firstly, paragraph 6 of the Framework exempts “participants with a binding coverage of non-
agricultural tariff lines of less than [35] percent [..] from making tariff reductions through the formula.  
Instead, we expect them to bind [100] percent of non-agricultural tariff lines at an average level that 
does not exceed the overall average of bound tariffs for all developing countries after full 
implementation of current concessions.”  Defining the binding level in average terms gives no clue 
about the final tariff structure.  Indeed, such a procedure induces the Members operating under this 
provision (mostly “vulnerable” developing countries) to widen as much as possible the range of their 
bound tariffs, binding at a very high level some tariffs at the cost of binding the other tariffs at a very 
low level.  In short, it induces the WTO Members to adopt a very distorted bound tariff structure that 
would be very costly for their consumers – and producers that account for a large share of domestic 
consumption. 
Secondly, paragraph 8 of the 2004 Framework states that “developing-country participants [..] shall be 
given the following flexibility:  (a) applying less than formula cuts to up to [10] percent of the tariff lines 
provided that the cuts are no less than half the formula cuts and that these tariff lines do not exceed 
[10] percent of the total value of a Member's imports; or (b) keeping, as an exception, tariff lines 
unbound, or not applying formula cuts for up to [5] percent of tariff lines provided they do not exceed 
[5] percent of the total value of a Member's imports.”  Paragraph 8(a) would permit to use very high 
Swiss coefficients.  For instance, it would allow a Swiss coefficient of 150 if a Swiss coefficient of 25 is 
the base coefficient. 6/  Paragraph 8(b) is totally open ended. 
 
                                                 
4 /The basic Swiss formula is T = [rt/(r+t)] where ‘t’ are the initial tariffs, ‘T’ the post-negotiation tariffs, and ‘r’ the reduction 
coefficient (hereafter the “Swiss coefficient”).  The Swiss coefficient is thus the only element to negotiate on.  In what follows, 
the expression “a Swiss60” means a Swiss coefficient of 60.  A variant of the basic formula could be T = rt/(rα + tα)1/α where ‘α’ is 
a “political” coefficient (to be negotiated) aiming to reduce tariff cuts in the low tariff range, hence to boost political support – a 
feature that could be particularly useful for the negotiations in the farm products (see below).  
5 /This necessity has induced negotiators to use the term of “flexibilities”.  However, the term of “exceptions” describes better the 
economic consequences of such flexibilities. 
6 /A Swiss25 cuts a tariff of 100 percent into a tariff of 20 percent.  Half this formula cut generates a tariff of 60 percent (100-
(80/2)).  A Swiss150 is enough to cut a tariff of 100 percent into a tariff of 60 percent. 
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A. The Current NAMA Tariffs:  An Overview 
In order to get a better sense of the issues at stake, Table 1 gives key information on the structure of 
the tariff schedules of 18 advanced and emerging economies which, all together, represent 83 of the 
world GDP (2004 estimates under power purchasing parity exchange rates). 7/  A deal between these 
countries would thus be decisive, especially if it could be based on instruments easy to extend (such 
as the Swiss formula with its almost costless capacity to modulate the reduction coefficients) to the 
other WTO Members. 
Table 1. Bound and applied tariffs, selected advanced and emerging economies
Number
of tariff bound applied tariff Maximum Maximum
lines [a] tariffs tariffs water >15% >50% >15% >50%
1 2 [b] 3 [c] 4 5 [d] 6 [d] 7 [d] 8 [d] 9 [d] 10 [d]
I.  Low bound and applied tariffs, minimal tariff water: offering cuts in peak tariffs
Japan 4327 2.3 2.3 0.0 28.5 25 0 25.0 13 0
USA 4428 3.4 3.3 0.1 38.6 120 0 33.1 80 0
EC 4441 4.0 4.0 0.0 57.5 38 1 42.8 37 0
Singapore 4306 4.1 0.0 4.1 10.0 0 2 0.0 0 0
Taiwan 4266 4.7 4.7 0.0 60.0 72 0 40.0 66 0
Canada 4427 5.3 4.0 1.3 25.0 360 0 20.1 255 0
II.  Moderate bound tariffs, low applied tariffs, moderate tariff water: offering more certainty (binding) and cuts in tariff peaks
Australia 3911 11.0 3.8 7.2 55.0 577 101 25.0 213 0
New-Zealand 4095 11.1 3.4 7.7 45.0 1450 0 40.0 228 0
III. Moderate bound and applied tariffs, low tariff water:  offering notable liberalisation while keeping certainty high
Korea 4347 10.2 6.7 3.5 36.8 552 0 30.0 59 0
South Africa 4247 11.0 7.8 3.2 60.0 1187 72 54.5 953 59
Malaysia 4247 11.2 8.0 3.2 300.0 1562 18 215.6 1234 10
China 4330 14.4 [e] 9.1 5.3 [e] 50 [f] -- -- 50.0 -- 0
IV. High bound tariffs, moderate applied tariffs and tariff water: offering notable liberalisation while offering more certainty
Philippines 4053 16.7 5.8 10.9 50.0 1886 127 40.0 954 0
Thailand 3522 20.2 10.0 10.2 80.0 2289 24 80.0 1243 19
V. High bound tariffs, moderate applied tariffs, high tariff water: offering substantial liberalisation and more certainty
Brazil 4233 29.4 12.7 16.7 85.0 3994 1 35.0 2196 0
Mexico 4374 34.8 13.4 21.4 50.0 4349 76 50.0 2450 0
Indonesia 4229 35.0 6.8 28.2 125.0 3864 21 80.0 592 3
India 3736 37.0 15.4 21.6 150.0 3505 715 (52.0 [g]) 3413 (708 [g])
Notes [a] Data available at the Harmonized System 6 digit (Forbes et alii [2004]).
[b] Data available at the Harmonized System 6 digit, except for China (see note [e]).
[c] Data from WTO Trade Profiles (tariffs applied in 2005).
[d] Data from Forbes et alii [2004].
[e] Due to its recent accession, China's average bound tariff has been arbitrarily set at the level of her
average applied tariff in 2002 (see text for explanation). China's current tariff water is nil.
[f] Data for these bound tariffs are those enforced in 2005.
[g] Data for the applied tariffs in 2000.
Sources: Forbes et alii, 2004. WTO Secretariat, 2007.
Applied tariffsAverage Bound tariffs
Nber of tariff lines Nber of tariff lines
 
Table 1 ranks these 18 economies by increasing bound tariffs, and suggests a breakdown into five 
relatively homogeneous groups.  Group I countries can offer little in NAMA other than to cut their 
relatively few (but crucial for the exporting sectors of their trading partners) peak tariffs in sectors, such 
as some clothing, chemical or automotive products in the EC case.  Group II countries can, above all, 
offer their trading partners more certainty by binding their remaining moderate or peak bound tariffs at 
their low applied level.  Group III countries can offer notable liberalisation opportunities, but they 
should do so while ensuring to keep tariff water at their current low level. 8/  Group IV countries can 
also offer notable tariff cuts, but, above all, they should offer their trading partners substantially more 
certainty by cutting their high bound tariffs.  Lastly, Group V countries can offer both substantial tariff 
cuts and certainty (binding). 
                                                 
7 /Table 1 relies on the (mostly 2002) tariffs at the 6 digit level of the standard tariff Harmonised System for the bound tariffs 
[Forbes et alii 2004] and on the 2005 applied tariffs [WTO Trade Profiles] for the average (column 3)Maximum tariffs are coming 
from Forbes et alii [2004]. 
8 /China has been put in Group III in order to take into account the fact that it is a recent WTO Member (after November 2001) 
and making use of provisions included in the 2004 Framework.  Current bound tariffs of China are 9 percent, leaving no tariff 
water (they would make China a member of Group II or even Group I).  The other recent WTO Members have a similar situation 
than China, but they are much smaller economies. 
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B. Listen to the European Business Community 
It is often said that trade negotiators suffer from a lack of support from their business community.  This 
has not been the case in the Doha negotiations.  In particular, European firms have, clearly and 
repeatedly, defined the concessions they expect in NAMA from the emerging economies, namely “no 
single [industrial] tariff above 15 percent at the end of the implementation period of the Doha Round 
(except for LDCs)” [UNICE 2006]. 
Such a target is economically sound for three reasons – meaning that it should be adopted by the 
advanced WTO Members as their goal for the Doha Round.  Firstly, its key virtue is to eliminate the 
tariff peaks that hurt the most the advanced economies’ exports, and that generate the bulk of the 
welfare costs imposed on the domestic consumers of the emerging economies.  Secondly, this target 
would vastly increase the certainty of access to the emerging countries’ markets for the advanced 
economies’ exporters – an outcome that is highly valued by the business community.  Lastly, this 
target is far to impose a brutal trade liberalisation on the emerging countries (it is close to their 
currently average applied tariffs, see column 3 of Table 1) a feature that should help to reduce 
requests for exceptions, and to make them as simple and predictable as possible (see below). 
All these reasons make really interesting to have a good concrete sense of the changes associated to 
the 15 percent target (using a base Swiss coefficient) and to simple and predictable exceptions (using 
Swiss coefficients higher than the base one).  However, it should be stressed that the tariff data used 
for developing such an outline are defined at a level (Harmonised System 6 digit) which is more 
aggregated than the level used by the negotiators [Forbes et alii 2004].  Hence, the results presented 
in the paper should be taken with some caution for individual industrial goods (notably, peak tariffs) 
since the available data could be the average of (very) different disaggregated tariffs.  By contrast, the 
calculations include already so many tariff lines that the results presented are likely to offer a good 
view of the situation.  
C. The Base Swiss Coefficient for the Emerging Countries 
Table 2 shows that the highest Swiss coefficients that would fulfill the European business target would 
range from a Swiss20 to a Swiss25.  The Swiss25 is the base Swiss coefficient chosen in this paper, 
despite the fact that it leaves a very high number of tariff lines with tariffs higher than 15 percent for 
Indonesia and India. 
Table 2. Calculations of possible tariff cuts, selected emerging countries
Average Maximum Average Maximum Average Maximum
bound Number Average bound bound Number Average bound bound Number Average bound
tariff of lines tariff tariff tariff of lines tariff tariff tariff of lines tariff tariff
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
I. Moderate bound and applied tariffs, low tariff water:  offering notable liberalisation while keeping certainty high
Korea 6.0 0 0.0 13.0 6.5 0 0.0 14.9 6.7 190 18.8 22.1
South Africa 5.2 0 0.0 15.0 5.8 230 16.5 17.6 6.2 266 23.1 30.0
Malaysia 5.4 8 17.7 18.8 6.0 25 18.0 23.1 6.2 118 21.6 50.0
II. High bound tariffs, moderate applied tariffs and tariff water: offering notable liberalisation while offering more certainty
Philippines 8.1 0 0.0 14.3 9.0 159 16.4 16.7 9.3 384 17.7 27.3
Thailand 9.2 17 16.0 16.0 10.3 41 17.3 19.0 10.6 211 20.0 34.3
III. High bound tariffs, moderate applied tariffs, high tariff water: offering substantial liberalisation and more certainty
Brazil 11.6 1 16.2 16.2 13.2 1 19.3 19.3 13.4 201 20.1 22.1
Mexico 12.7 0 0.0 14.3 12.6 82 16.1 16.7 14.7 206 20.2 27.3
Indonesia 12.2 20 17.1 17.2 14.1 2692 15.4 20.8 14.4 2701 15.9 34.3
India 12.4 10 17.2 17.6 14.3 2571 15.8 21.4 14.7 2571 16.5 42.0
Notes [a] Based on a Swiss factor of 25 combined with a Swiss of 40 for 4 percent of the tariff lines and a factor of 60 for 2
percent of the tariff lines.  The two highest Swiss factors have been systematically applied to the currently highest
applied tariffs.
Source Forbes et alii, 2004.  Author's computations.
Swiss factor = 20 Swiss factor = 25 Combined Swiss factor [a]
Tariffs  >15% Tariffs  >15% Tariffs  >15%
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There are three reasons for such a choice.  Firstly, almost all the post-Doha tariffs still above 15 
percent with a Swiss25 are smaller than 16 percent (Indonesia) or 17 percent (India) – hence meaning 
that the Swiss25 is a very limited departure from the European business target.  Secondly, the choice 
of a Swiss25 aims at changing the negotiating dynamics by promoting the notion that a more 
“generous” base Swiss coefficient should be “paid” by less numerous and/or arcane exceptions.  For 
instance, choosing a Swiss25 (rather than a Swiss22 or 23 which would completely eliminate tariffs 
higher than 15 percent) should be paid by a more compromising attitude of the emerging economies 
on exceptions.  Lastly – and crucially in the Doha context – the choice of a Swiss25 would make 
easier the fulfilment of the “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments” condition, as shown 
below. 
In sharp contrast with this approach, some advanced WTO Members have insisted on the use of a 
Swiss15 for the emerging economies.  A Swiss15 would clearly go beyond the European business 
target since it would generate maximum tariffs in the emerging countries of roughly 13 percent.  Such 
an “overshooting” raises serious doubts on whether some of these advanced WTO Members really 
want to negotiate. 9/  An alternative explanation is that these negotiators see liberalisation as imposing 
that most (all) post-Round bound tariffs should be lower than the pre-Round applied tariffs.  With the 
huge backlog of tariff water in the Doha Round, such an interpretation of what makes tariff binding 
valuable amounts to request from the emerging countries to deliver in one Round tariff cuts that the 
advanced economies delivered in two or three Rounds.  No wonder then that such an “overshooting” 
has pushed the emerging countries’ negotiators to look for wide exceptions in NAMA, offering to a 
dozen of industrial countries the excuse to do the same in farm and food products – ultimately a self-
defeating sequence for every WTO Member. 
D. Predictable Exceptions for the Emerging Economies 
Exceptions should be defined in such a way that negotiators could easily predict their impact on the 
final balance of concessions between their own country and its trading partners.  The scope of the 
exceptions and their level are the two most basic dimensions to define. 10/  If there is only one way for 
defining the scope of the exceptions (namely the number of tariff lines eligible for the exceptions) there 
are many possible ways to define the level of the exceptions.  So far, the Doha negotiators have 
shown some attraction for complex and loose exceptions.  However, the multilateral trade regime, and 
every WTO Member, would greatly benefit from a simple definition for the exceptions because 
simplicity improves the capacity to predict and to assess the magnitude and impact of the exceptions.  
By contrast, complex definitions of exceptions generate self inflicted costs, such as rents hard to 
predict (see below the discussion on the tariff-rate quotas in agriculture). 
In NAMA, the most natural way to put simplicity in practice seems to use Swiss coefficient(s) higher 
than the base one.  Hence, what follows uses a “combined Swiss formula” based on two Swiss 
coefficients higher than the base one. 
The first step for generating such a combined Swiss formula consists in defining the highest Swiss 
coefficient.  A hint for a plausible highest Swiss coefficient flows from Table 1 (column 5) which shows 
that only half of the 18 economies have bound tariffs higher than 50 percent, and that only four are 
currently enforcing a tiny number of tariffs higher than 50 percent. 11/  A 50 percent bound tariff as the 
highest post-Doha tariff for the 18 countries seems thus a very reasonable target (with the data used).  
It means that a Swiss60 would be the highest Swiss coefficient since it cuts a 300 percent tariff (the 
highest bound tariff for the 18 countries) into a 50 percent bound tariff. 
                                                 
9 //These doubts have been amplified by the fact that these Ministers are insisting on a Swiss10 for the advanced economies 
and on very limited tariff cuts in agriculture.  That said, it should be underlined said that a Swiss coefficient defines the highest 
possible post-Doha tariff for initial tariffs much higher than those existing in the real world (a point that many negotiators did not 
immediately realize).  For instance, a Swiss20 will cut an initial (pre-Doha) tariff close to 500 percent into a tariff of 19.2 percent.  
But tariffs of 500 percent are very rare in the real world (there is none in Table 1).  For high tariffs not too rare in today world 
(say 50 percent) the post-Doha tariff with a Swiss20 is 14.3 percent only. 
10 /There can be other dimensions for defining exceptions, such as the transition period allowed for enforcing the commitments,.  
Those dimensions are often defined at a later stage of the negotiations, when comes the time of the ultimate adjustments. 
11 /Unfortunatly, this observation does not include India, because of the absence of data on current applied India’s tariffs which 
would be compatible with the data for the other countries. 
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The next step is to define the scope of the Swiss60, that is, to define the number of tariff lines for 
which the highest Swiss coefficient could be used.  Table 1 suggests 2 percent of the tariff lines as a 
plausible scope because this is the share of all the tariff lines with a bound pre-Doha tariff higher than 
50 percent (in accordance with the logic of the Swiss formula that is to compress tariff rates without 
changing their ranking).  The last step is to define an intermediate Swiss coefficient and its additional 
coverage of the tariff lines.  The coefficient is arbitrarily assumed to be 40, and the coverage to 4 
percent of the tariff lines. 
Based on this “combined Swiss formula”, Table 2 shows that the emerging countries would exhibit 
average bound tariffs ranging from 6.7 to 14.7 percent, with a maximum bound tariff of 50 percent, but 
with very few tariffs higher than 30 percent.  Moreover, the fact that the number of tariff lines with a 
tariff higher than 15 percent does not increase notably (compared to those in the case of a Swiss25 
alone, see Table 2) suggests the combined Swiss coefficient as an interesting compromise between 
the exceptions to be introduced and the liberalisation targetted by the European business community. 
Table 3 summarizes the changes in protection generated by such a combined Swiss formula.  The 
average bound tariff would be cut by 4 to 22 percentage points (column 1), and the maximum bound 
tariffs by 15 to 250 percentage points (column 2).  In addition, cuts in bound tariffs would have an 
impact on the applied tariffs.  This is clearly the case for the maximum applied tariffs that would be cut 
by 8 to 165 percentage points (column 4).  Once again, this is an important result because it is a 
crucial source of welfare gains:  Effective cuts in terms of average tariffs would be limited to three 
countries (column 3) but the average tariff water would be eliminated or reduced to a low level in all 
the others – a result of considerable importance for, and highly valued by, the business community. 
Although they largely consist in eliminating tariff water, these results may be perceived as a notable 
reduction of “policy space”.  However, this impression is inaccurate [Page 2006]).  Of course, these 
results imply some reduction of policy space at the borders.  But as illustrated by the advanced 
economies during the last fifty years, policy space has almost completely shifted to the “behind-the-
border” agenda, if only because tariffs are much less efficient instruments than domestic taxes and 
subsidies on goods, services and production factors, all instruments ensuring a policy space that is 
quite consistent with WTO disciplines. 
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Table 3. Summary of tariff cuts generated by a "combined
Swiss formula", selected emerging countries
average maximum
[a] [b] avg [c] max [d]
1 2 3
III. Offering some liberalisation, keeping certainty high
4
Korea -3.5 -14.7 0.0 -7.9
South Africa -4.8 -30.0 -1.6 -24.5
Malaysia -5.0 -250.0 -1.8 -165.6
China n.a. -22.7 n.a. -22.7
IV. Offering some liberalisation and more certainty
Philippines -7.4 -22.7 3.5 -12.7
Thailand -9.6 -45.7 0.6 -45.7
V. Offering more liberalisation and more certainty
Brazil -16.0 -62.9 0.7 -12.9
Mexico -20.1 -22.7 1.3 -22.7
Indonesia -20.6 -90.7 7.6 -45.7
India -22.3 -108.0 -0.7 -10.0
Notes:
[a] (post-Doha avg bound tariffs) minus (current avg bound tariffs).
[b] (post-Doha max bound tariffs) minus (current max bound tariffs).
[c] (post-Doha avg bound tariffs) minus (current avg applied tariffs).
[d] (post-Doha max bound tariffs) minus (current max applied tariffs).
Sources: Forbes et alii [2004], Table 2.
(percentage points)
Cuts in bound tariffs
(percentage points)
Applied tariff cuts due
to bound tariff cuts
 
 
E. The Base Swiss Coefficient for the Advanced Economies and the Two Core Doha 
Criteria 
The potential offer of the advanced economies is mostly limited to cuts in peak tariffs, and to cuts in 
bound tariffs for Australia and New Zealand.  These cuts have a great economic value for the 
emerging economies because industrial economies’ tariffs peaks are concentrated on their imports.  
But, their “negotiating value” (often measured by the import weighted tariff cuts) is limited. 
Would a Swiss10 deliver enough tariff cuts from the advanced economies for being considered as 
complying with the “less than full reciprocity” criterion?  Or should it be a Swiss coefficient lower than 
10?  For instance, a coalition of developing countries (called NAMA11) argues for a 25 percentage 
points difference between the base Swiss coefficient for the emerging economies and the base Swiss 
formula for the advanced economies (meaning a Swiss0 for these economies if a Swiss25 is adopted 
for the emerging economies). 
This question should be re-stated as follows.  What would be the economic value of a Swiss 
coefficient lower than 10 for the emerging economies?  For instance, shifting from a Swiss10 to a 
Swiss5 would reduce the maximum bound tariffs of the advanced economies from a range of 5.0-8.6 
percent to a range of 3.3-4.6 percent (it would reduce their average bound tariffs from a range of 1.4-
4.4 percent to a range of 1.0-2.8 percent).  From the emerging countries’ point of view, gains from so 
limited cuts of so low tariffs are not very attractive – especially if once enforced, they trigger more 
antidumping or safeguard actions from the advanced economies against exports from the emerging 
economies. 
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An economically sound alternative for the emerging economies may thus be a deal based on a 
Swiss25 for the emerging countries and a Swiss10 for the advanced economies – reflecting the basic 
fact that the advanced economies have liberalised much more and earlier than the emerging 
countries. 12/  Clearly, this tentative conclusion also depends upon the concessions of the advanced 
economies in the negotiations in agriculture.  The deeper concessions in agriculture from the 
advanced economies would be, the more a Swiss25-Swiss10 deal in NAMA would be acceptable for 
the emerging economies – and the more the “comparably high level of ambition in market access for 
Agriculture and NAMA” criterion would be met. 
IV. The Negotiations in “Agriculture” 
At a first glance, the “comparably high level of ambition” criterion seems a target out of reach since 
trade liberalization in farm products is so much lagging behind liberalisation in NAMA products.  
However, this first impression disappears when one recognizes the critical fact that talking about 
negotiations in “agriculture” is a misnomer.  The current negotiations deal with many more agro-
industrial (hereafter “food”) goods than with farm products.  More precisely, these negotiations cover 
roughly 2000 tariff lines, with 1100 lines being classified as processed food products, and 500 
additional ones as semi-processed food products.  This little recognized feature is crucial because 
trade liberalisation in food products is, by nature, much closer to trade liberalisation in industrial 
products than to trade liberalisation in farm products.  Making a clear distinction between these two 
very different types of products opens thus a window of opportunities in the Doha negotiations in 
“agriculture”. 
A. Assessing the Tariff Cutting Formulas in Agriculture 
The negotiators in farm and food products face a problem that does not exist in NAMA.  The formulas 
which, so far, have been tabled for cutting tariffs on farm and food products are much murkier than the 
Swiss formula adopted in NAMA.  The negotiators have agreed to work on complex “tiered” formulas, 
and even awkward at some points.  A tiered formula is 16 times more complex than a Swiss formula 
since, as shown by Table 4, negotiators should strike a deal on no less than 16 figures for developed 
countries (three thresholds defining four tariff ranges, four percentage cuts for each range, and a tariff 
cap) and they should do the same for the developing countries (and for any sub-group of them if 
required by the negotiations).  Awkward discontinuities appear at the points connecting two different 
tiers.  For instance, under the EC tiered formula, an initial tariff of 89 percent would be cut to a post-
Doha tariff of 44.5 percent, whereas an initial tariff of 91 percent would be cut to a post-Doha tariff of 
36.4 percent.  Such discontinuities make hard to get an agreement on defining the various tiers, and 
they fuel the need of exceptions to accommodate such an agreement. 
Assessing the economic and political impact of the tabled formulas appears thus essential.  It requires 
a benchmark, and Paragraph 24 and common sense suggest to take a Swiss-like approach as the 
benchmark since the “comparably high level of ambition” condition would be much easier to check if 
the same instrument is used for cutting tariffs in agriculture and in manufacturing.  For simplicity sake, 
what follows presents this exercise only for the EC tiered formula. 
                                                 
12 /The 15 percentage points wedge between a Swiss25 and a Swiss10 suggested in this paper happens to be the simple 
average of the 25 percentage points wedge suggested by the NAMA11 Group (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, 
Namibia, Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia and Venezuela) and of the 5 percentage points wedge (between a Swiss15 and a 
Swiss10) suggested by some advanced economies. 
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Table 4. Tabled proposals on farm tariff cuts, 2005
definition tariff cut definition tariff cut definition tariff cut
of the tiers (%) (%) (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developed countries
highest tier >90% 60 >75% 75 >60% 85-90
medium high 60-90% 50 50-75% 65 40-60% 75-85
medium low 30-60% 45 20-50% 55 20-40% 65-75
lowest tier 0-30% 35 0-20% 45 0-20% 55-65
Tariff cuts to be imposed on developing countries
highest band >130% 40 >130% 40 >60% [a]
medium high 80-130% 35 80-130% 35 40-60% [a]
medium low 30-80% 30 30-80% 30 20-40% [a]
lowest band 0-30% 25 <30% 25 0-20% [a]
Other elements of tariff rates
cap tariff (developed countries) -- 100 -- 100 -- 75
cap tariff (developing countries) -- 150 -- 150 -- 100
Source: The EC, G20 and U.S. proposals.  Note [a]: Reference to "slightly lesser reductions" without more precision.
EC proposal U.S. proposalG20 proposal
 
Figure 1 illustrates the EC tiered offer and two Swiss formulas, one with a coefficient of 60 and 
another one with a coefficient 70 for reasons explained below.  The horizontal axis gives the current 
EC tariffs (including the ad valorem equivalents, as estimated by the Commission, of the many EC 
specific tariffs) with the exception of one tariff line (exhibiting a tariff of 408 percent, while the second 
highest tariff is 264 percent).  The vertical axis illustrates the post-Doha tariffs which would be 
obtained by using the various formulas.  The EC tiered proposal is illustrated by the four straight lines, 
the Swiss60 coefficient by the lower and long curve line, and the Swiss70 coefficient by the higher and 
shorter curve line. 
Figure 1 provides a crucial result for the EC domestic policy makers.  A Swiss-like approach would 
impose deeper tariff cuts on the current (pre-Doha) highest tariffs than the EC tiered formula, and 
smaller tariff cuts on the currently less protected products than the EC tiered formula.  For instance, 
the Swiss60 would cut an initial tariff of 90 percent into a post-Doha tariff of 36 percent (compared to 
45 percent in case of the tiered formula) and it would cut an initial tariff of 25 percent into a post-Doha 
tariff of 17.6 percent (compared to 16.3 percent if the tiered formula is used). 
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Figure 1.  Assessing the EC tier-based formula for tariff cuts
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Figure 1 provides a last important conclusion.  It presents increasingly “dotted” lines and curves 
because the number of current EC tariffs above 90 percent are increasingly rare.  The tiered formula 
means that post-Doha tariffs derived from the initial EC tariffs higher than 90 percent can still vary a lot 
(from 40 to 110 percent!).  And this would be the case even if the initial tariffs are imposed on close 
varieties of the same family of products.  For instance, the tariffs for close varieties of grape juice or 
buttermilk vary by a coefficient of 2 to 3 depending on the variety classification.  Such a tariff structure 
would inevitably create misclassifications by EC Customs (with high risks of corruption) and it will 
generate severe distortions in European production at a very disaggregated level.  Because it 
“compresses” the ranking of the highest tariffs, a Swiss-like approach minimizes such distortions 
(depending the Swiss coefficient adopted).  For instance, a Swiss60 would “compress” the initial EC 
tariffs higher than 90 percent to the range of 36 to 50 percent only. 
 
B. Farmers Are Not the Main Beneficiaries of the Tabled Proposal 
A Swiss-like approach would rebalance the existing EC offer in an economically sound way by 
bringing two types of improvements.  Cutting deeper into the highest tariffs would create most of the 
welfare gains that European consumers – especially the poorest – should expect from a liberalisation.  
And, because it reduces the huge distortions among the relative prices of the farm and food products 
generated by widely different tariffs, a narrower range of post-Doha tariffs would nurture a more far-
reaching reallocation of resources among all the farm and food products. 
But, its most surprizing result is that it would also have a positive impact on domestic politics.  
European producers of the goods getting smaller tariff cuts would clearly support a shift to a Swiss-like 
approach, while those associated to deeper tariff cuts would fight against it.  As long as the former 
group constitutes a larger and stronger coalition than the latter, a Swiss-like approach is politically 
superior to the current tiered proposal.  The key questions is thus:  Who would be the producers 
benefiting from such a rebalance? 
 12
 GEMWP-2007-04
Answering this question requires to associate a level of processing to every tariff line.  What follows 
draws this information from the table of concordance established by the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) between every tariff line and a processing level. 13/  Applying the USDA 
concordance table to the EC tariffs allows to get several results which open new perspectives in the 
negotiations.  Table 5 summarizes the critical results. 
Firstly, it shows the strong “tariff escalation” among the initial EC tariffs – the more processed the 
goods are, the higher their level of protection is.  Table 5 shows that the average tariff of the bulk farm 
products (19.7 percent) is substantially lower than the average tariff of the processed food products 
(32.3 percent), and, even more strikingly, the highest tariff for the farm products (93.6 percent) is much 
smaller than the highest tariff on processed food (264.3 percent).  It is worth mentioning the two main 
reasons behind such a strong tariff escalation.  Firstly, it was the conviction which has prevailed until 
the Uruguay Round that food processors should be highly protected in order to counterbalance the 
high prices to be paid when buying European farm products.  Secondly, it is the methodology adopted 
in great haste [Groser 2007] by a few Trade Ministers at the May 2005 Paris informal Ministerial for 
calculating the ad valorem tariff equivalent of the many specific tariffs in agriculture.  In other words, 
the initial high tariff escalation in the EC tiered formula mirrors a far away and a recent past much 
more than a current reason. 
Table 5. Rebalancing the EC tariff proposal
Current
ad val. Post-Doha tariffs (%)
equivalent
tariffs EC Swiss Swiss Swiss
% offer 70 60 50
All "agricultural" products (2011 tariff lines)
average tariffs 24.4 12.9 13.9 13.1 12.2
Bulk farm commodities (117 tariff lines)
average tariffs 19.7 10.7 11.8 11.1 10.3
maximum tariff 93.6 43.7 40.0 36.6 32.6
number of tariff lines with smaller cuts [b] 65 60 42
number of tariff lines with larger cuts [b] 8 13 31
Produces/horticulture products (273 tariff lines)
average tariffs 13.6 8.0 9.7 9.3 8.9
maximum tariff 118.9 47.6 44.1 39.9 35.2
number of tariff lines with smaller cuts [b] 214 210 202
number of tariff lines with larger cuts [b] 5 9 17
Semiprocessed products (488 tariff lines)
average tariffs 12.6 6.8 7.6 7.2 6.7
maximum tariff 174.9 70.0 50.0 44.7 38.9
number of tariff lines with smaller cuts [b] 262 243 226
number of tariff lines with larger cuts [b] 24 43 60
Processed products (1120 tariff lines)
average tariffs 32.3 16.9 17.8 16.7 15.5
maximum tariff 264.3 105.7 55.3 48.9 42.0
number of tariff lines with smaller cuts [b] 949 847 749
number of tariff lines with larger cuts [b] 118 222 318
Notes [a] it was impossible to allocate ** tariff lines in the three categories of products.
[b] in case of using a Swiss formula instead of the EC tier-based formula.
Source EC tariff offer in agriculture. Author's computation.  
Secondly, the tariff cuts proposed by the current EC proposal protect food producers much more often 
than farmers.  Table 5 shows that the post-Doha tariffs would be 10.7 percent for the bulk farm 
commodities compared to 16.9 percent for processed food products, while the post-Doha tariff peaks 
would be 43.7 percent for those farm products, compared to 105.7 percent for processed food.  
Interestingly, the food products that would remain the EC most protected items after the Doha Round 
are a strange hodgepodge of waste products (dog and cat food, offal, whey, etc.) goods with tiny 
                                                 
13 /The USDA concordance splits the whole universe of the “agricultural” products into four subsets:  the bulk farm commodities, 
the produce/horticulture products, the semi-processed products and the processed products.. 
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potential in international trade (yoghurts) and products of questionable importance (cucumbers, 
gherkins, etc.). 
Thirdly, protecting farmers does not require to protect food producers.  Farmers are, to a notable 
extent, immune to changes in the composition of the various processed food products which can be 
derived from their farm production.  For instance, milk can be used to produce butter, cheese, 
yoghurts, sweets, etc., as coal can be used for producing steel or chemicals.  (Who would argue that 
protecting coal requires to protect steel or chemicals?)  If some processed dairy products are highly 
protected, it is at the detriment of the less protected processed dairy products.  Re-balancing 
protection among food products would mostly generate a re-allocation of the farm production among 
its various possible uses in the food industry.  It is often argued that such a conclusion would not hold 
for some products (called “sensitive” in the Doha jargon) such as dairy products, sugar, beef or 
poultry.  But, looking at the detailed tariffs does not suggest that this argument is very convincing (see 
below). 
Lastly, tariff escalation is not necessary anymore for “immunizing” European food producers against 
the high protection granted to European farm products.  This argument is becoming obsolete for two 
reasons.  Farm prices have been exposed to productivity gains in the advanced countries’ agriculture.  
And, more importantly, farm products represent a much smaller share of the total costs of the final 
food products (often within the range of 10-15 percent of the prices paid by the consumers) that they 
used to be.  In other words, aligning the protection of the food products to the protection of the farm 
products is unlikely to have a notable impact on the competitiveness of the food producers. 
C. Re-balancing Tariff Cuts 
That said, a better EC tariff offer should meet two conditions.  It should be ambitious enough to fulfill 
the “comparably high level of ambition” criterion imposed by the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial.  And, it 
should attract domestic European political support – it should be seen as a better deal than the current 
EC offer by a vast majority of the farmers and food producers.  The following outline shows that it is 
possible.  It is expressed in Swiss-type terms for reasons already mentioned.  But, it should be 
stressed that it could be presented with a tiered formula (it is always possible to approximate a curve 
by a sequence of straight lines) though at the cost of discontinuities and complexities as those 
illustrated above with Figure 1. 
Table 5 suggests that a base Swiss coefficient of 60 would be a substantial improvement over the EC 
current offer. 14/  Firstly, it would generate an average EC tariff in farm and food products of roughly 13 
percent.  This is an interesting figure since it is similar to the average tariffs in NAMA products of some 
large emerging economies (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico) and not far away from the average tariff 
of China, Philippines and Thailand.  In other words, it would fill the “comparably high level of ambition” 
criterion.  One could argue that the EC tiered proposal does the same.  But, the Swiss60 would fill the 
“comparably high level of ambition” criterion in another respect – and that is not the case of the EC 
tiered proposal.  The Swiss60 would generate a maximum EC tariff on farm and food products very 
close to 50 percent, precisely the maximum tariff suggested for the emerging economies when 
suggesting the outline for the NAMA negotiations. 
Secondly, if a base Swiss60 would not be a brutal change of EC policy in average terms (compared to 
the tiered formula) it would generate a notable re-balancing:  287 tariff lines would have larger tariff 
cuts than those currently proposed, and 1360 tariff lines smaller tariff cuts than those currently tabled 
(364 lines would see no change).  More crucially, the additional cuts would occur almost exclusively 
(in 92 percent of the cases) in the processed and semi-processed product sectors. 
In other words, re-balancing would clearly improve the situation of a vast majority of the farmers 
compared to their situation under the tiered proposal.  Table 5 shows the very few bulk and 
horticulture products that would be concerned by additional cuts, and the many products that would 
benefit from tariff cuts smaller than those created by the tiered formula.  Moreover, the maximum 
                                                 
14 /For information sake, Table 4 includes the case of a Swiss50.  Such a Swiss coefficient may create problems in the farm 
products, but interestingly, the political balance may be still positive in the processed food products. 
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additional cuts are limited (8.1 percent in the farm bulk commodities, and 7.7 percent in the 
horticulture products). 
Although tariffs with larger cuts are concentrated in the processed food sector,  rebalancing would 
keep almost unchanged the average tariff of all the processed food products.  But, compared to the 
current EC offer, it would cut more deeply 222 food tariffs – on average, from 45.5 to 35 percent, but 
by more than 5 percent for only 87 tariffs, and by more than 10 percent for only 46 tariffs (a dozen of 
which are various forms of whey).  Meanwhile, it would cut less deeply 847 food tariffs (from 11.4 to 
13.1 percent on average).  A vast majority in the processed sector would thus gain from rebalancing, 
all the more if the food markets in the rest of the world would be also opened up. 
However, it is important to check in more detail the case of the “sensitive” products for which food 
tariffs are often said to have an impact on farm products (this check allows to have results 
independent from the way the USDA concordance table is done).  In the case of poultry, lamb and 
beef, very few lines would face tariff cuts notably larger with a Swiss60, compared to a tiered formula.  
Only 2 (out of 100) 3 (out of 30) and 4 (out of 56) tariff lines (respectively) would face additional tariff 
cuts larger than 5 percentage points – a proportion so small that one should not expect serious 
problems for the farmers involved.  In the case of dairy products, 40 tariff lines (out of 170) would face 
additional tariff cuts larger than 5 percentage points, and two dozen of tariff lines additional cuts larger 
than 10 percentage points.  In the case of sugar, half a dozen tariff lines (out of 34) would face 
additional tariff cuts larger than 5 percentage points.  In short, shifting to a Swiss60 could raise 
problems for less than 50 tariff lines.  However, as underlined above, many of the dairy products 
exhibit wide differences in tariffs which are totally or largely unrelated to the farm sector – for instance, 
a different packaging size or different but close varieties. 
These observations deflate notably the concerns often raised.  But, as in the NAMA negotiations, 
there remains a need for defining predictable exceptions.  Currently, the Doha negotiators are 
considering an intensive use of “tariff-rate quotas” (i.e., limited imported quantities of a good are 
subjected to a “in quota” tariff which is lower than the normal “out-of-quota” tariff imposed on the rest 
of the imports of this product) as the preferred instrument for exceptions.  The Uruguay Round 
introduced them in agriculture as a device for beginning to open farm markets left closed by the very 
high tariffs agreed in the Round.  In the Doha negotiations, the EC (and other WTO Members) are 
using them as a device for reducing less the out-of-quota tariffs – in other words, increasing quantities 
to be imported under the in-quota tariff is the “price” to be paid for keeping high the out-of-quota tariff.  
This is a self-defeating approach.  If the European demand becomes smaller than the quota, the EC 
price will reflect the low in-quota tariff (the out-of-quota tariff playing no role) meaning that the EC 
producers would be (much) more strongly exposed to freer trade than expected by the negotiators.  If 
the European demand exceeds the quota, the EC price will be determined by the world price plus the 
high out-of-quota tariff, generating huge rents for the quota beneficiaries.  Who would get these rents?  
The answer depends on several parameters, but there is an almost sure bet:  not the European 
farmers. 
There are thus good reasons for the EC farmers to avoid the trap of the tariff-rate quotas.  As 
suggested above for the NAMA negotiations, the best solution may be the simplest one, that is, it 
would consist in (a) higher Swiss coefficient(s).  Table 5 investigates this possibility with a Swiss70 (or 
its tiered equivalent) on the farm bulk commodities.  Firstly, a Swiss70 would attract farmers’ support 
because it would increase the average tariff on farm products to 11.8 percent, compared to 10.7 
percent under the current offer, and it would reduce only 8 farm tariffs (with larger tariff cuts limited to 
4.8 percent at most).  Secondly, using a Swiss70 only for the bulk commodities amounts to make 
exceptions for only 5 percent of the total tariff lines in farm and food products, a figure close to the 
scope of exceptions in NAMA, hence meeting the “comparably high level of ambition” criterion.  Lastly, 
this criterion would still be met if a few additional tariff lines – such as the above-mentioned 35 tariff 
lines in the food sector – are shifted under a Swiss70. 
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D. Balancing Tariff Cuts and Domestic Support Cuts 
Table 6 shows that the estimated amounts of domestic support granted in 2004 are much below the 
Uruguay Round final bound commitments for both the U.S. and the EC.  In other words, there is a 
huge “subsidy water” in the domestic support of these two countries (which echoes the huge tariff 
water observed in NAMA for the emerging economies). 
As a first glance, Table 6 suggests a somewhat comfortable negotiating position for the EC, mostly 
because it has introduced “decoupled” subsidies (it has moved roughly 25 billions of euros out of the 
perimeter of the “overall trade distorting support”).  By contrast, the U.S. is still granting subsidies 
which are responsive to world prices, hence eligible to the Amber Box.  As of March 2007, the U.S. 
position on these issues in the future is hard to decipher since the legislative process for a new Farm 
Bill has only started. 
Table 6.  Domestic support in the EC and the U.S. (billion U.S.$ [a])
U.S. EC25
1.  The Amber Box (the most trade-distorting subsidies)
The Uruguay final bound commitments 19.1 88.0
Effective amounts in 2004 13.0 42.0
Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 [b] 30.0
The Doha final bound commitments: proposals based
on the EC formula 7.6 26.7
on the U.S. formula 7.6 15.1
on the G20 formula 5.7 17.8
2.  Overall Trade Distorting Support [c]
The Uruguay final bound commitments 55.0 148.0
Effective amounts in 2004 23.0 73.0
Estimated amounts in 2006-2010 18.0 [d] 37.0
The Doha final bound commitments: proposals based
on the EC formula 22.0 44.7
on the U.S. formula 25.9 37.3
on the G20 formula 13.8 29.8
Notes [a] Exchange rate: one euro for 1,20 U.S. dollar.
[b] Unknown (depend on world price evolution).
[c] Sum of the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS), "de minimis"
subsidies and Blue Box subsidies.
[d] Estimate based on the USDA Farm Bill 2007 Proposal.
SourcesEC, U.S. and G20 Proposals.
Penn [2005] Jales and Nassar [2006] Kutas [2006].  
However, this impression of a EC “comfortable” position is misleading for three reasons.  Firstly, the 
OECD estimates of the domestic support provided to the EC farmers (the “producer support 
estimates” or PSEs) is roughly 100-110 billions of euros, that is, 25-35 billions of euros above the 
2004 “overall trade distorting support”.  If the EC position looks comfortable under the current WTO 
definitions, it could become rapidly less comfortable if those definitions are strengthened.  In particular, 
half of the EC AMS support is generated by the EC market price support scheme the status of which 
critically depends from whether (and to which extent) the Doha negotiators will narrow, or not, the 
scope of allowable support. 
Secondly, even the “decoupled” subsidies will be exposed to increased scrutiny.  From an 
international perspective, they allow farmers to do business as usual if they wish so.  It should be 
stressed that the 2003 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has decoupled EC subsidies 
without bringing any new notable liberalization of the European farm sector, as best illustrated by the 
European overall level of protection from 57 to 55 percent, all other things being constant [OECD 
2004].  From a domestic perspective, there is a growing recognition in Europe that direct payments go 
mostly to large farmers for which few Europeans want to fight.  Interestingly, the Europeans (including 
the French) are, on average, more favorable to serious cuts in farm subsidies than Americans 
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[German Marshall Fund 2006].  Moreover, decoupled subsidies will undoubtedly face an increasing 
legitimacy problem.  As time flies, it will be increasingly politically unsustainable to grant subsidies to 
farmers on the basis of productions they did in an increasingly far away past. 
Lastly, it would be suprizing that there would be no pressures for “recoupling” subsidies in some new 
ways.  A strong candidate for such a “recoupling” is biofuels (particularly, bioethanol), a sector 
witnessing a very worrisome boom in subsidies (mostly under the even more distortive form of tax 
deductions) in key industrial countries.  This evolution is very unfortunate in the EC case because the 
recent decline of the EC sugar price has just revealed to efficient European sugar growers how much 
the CAP was their foe.  By keeping alive inefficient European sugar growers (who are now turning to 
alternative crops) the CAP has made impossible for the most efficient European sugar growers (such 
as those in France or Britain) to enter profitable markets for them (such as the Italian sugar market).  
Biofuel subsidies will simply push these efficient sugar growers more away from what they should do 
first – to be an efficient source of farm products for food – at the risk of letting them down when new 
sources of energy will emerge (or if the oil price declines further, thanks to fuel conservation or less 
buoyant growth in the emerging countries).  The Doha negotiators should thus start to make difficult 
the production of (allegedly) clean energy as an excuse for giving subsidies to clearly inefficient 
productions (such as the first generation of biofuels). 
All these issues should induce the Doha negotiators to start to introduce disciplines which would 
increasingly limit farm subsidies largely to adjustment purposes and well defined “non-trade concerns”.  
And they emphasize the need to cut agricultural tariffs, since lower tariffs are one of the best 
disciplines on subsidisation simply they make subsidies more visible and expensive. 
E. Services, Property Rights and Negotiations in Farm and Food Products 
Many negotiators do not seem yet to have fully realized that modern agriculture is intensive in services 
(from logistics to finance).  The EC would benefit from knowing better the services content of its 
agricultural sector in order to get a sense of the growth in agriculture-related services that would flow 
from trade liberalisation in farm and food products, and vice-versa (the growth in farm and food 
products driven by more open agriculture-related services).  As the EC is an advanced economy with 
well developed services, it is likely to have notable advantages in agriculture-related services that 
could provide profitable opportunities to European farmers with direct stakes in such services. 
This logic is similar to the one between agriculture and intellectual property rights, as illustrated by the 
“geographic indications” (GIs).  On this topic, the approach adopted by the Commission in the Doha 
Round – asking for strong GIs as a price to be paid for getting farm tariff or subsidy cuts – misses a 
key point.  It assumes a causality – the stronger the GIs are, the better the situation of the sector is – 
which is far to be proven, as best illustrated by the recent evolution of the French wine sector.  Strong 
and rigid French regulations on GIs in the Bordeaux wine have not prevented the collapse of this wine 
sector – in fact, they may have contributed to it by freezing backward and small production and 
marketing structures.  There is an increasing recognition that GIs are best defended by flexible 
regulations inducing firms large enough to improve continuously their products in order to react to the 
ever changing tastes of the consumers, as best illustrated by Champagne vineyard. 
F. Would the Failure of the Doha Round Save the CAP? 
Some European quarters are hoping to save the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) by letting the 
Doha Round fail.  This is an illusion.  The Doha Round – even if unsuccessful – has given a definitive 
stroke to the current CAP. 
Firstly, the anti-farmer bias of the tiered formula is a blunt mirror of the true balance between farm and 
food products that all the Member States’ Agriculture Ministers have agreed to. 
Secondly, the Doha negotiations are making European farmers increasingly aware of the fact that the 
impact of common European tariffs varies with each Member state production structure.  A Member 
State producing mostly farm goods protected by high EC tariffs is, on average, “more” protected than 
a Member State producing mostly farm goods protected by low or moderate EC tariffs.  Table 7 
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illustrates this point by weighting the Member States’s production by the EC-wide level of protection 
(be it measured by tariffs or by the combined protection granted by tariffs and subsidies as measured 
by the OECD “producer support equivalents”).  
Table 7 shows that, on average, farmers in Ireland are roughly twice more protected than those in 
Southern European Member States, simply because the Irish production is much more concentrated 
(than the Southern European production) in the farm products that are the most protected by the EC.  
An “uniform” protection on all the farm products would be politically appealing to European farmers (it 
would be much fairer).  It would be economically interesting for them (it would induce them to produce 
the crops in which they are the best, not in which they receive high subsidies).  And, it would be 
beneficial for the European consumers since it would enhance not only farm efficiency, but also food 
diversity. 
Ironically, Table 7 shows that, contrary to a wide belief, French farmers are not among the most 
protected in Europe.  Indeed, French farmers would be a major beneficiary of successful Doha 
negotiations in agriculture for two combined reasons.  They would benefit from rebalanced tariffs since 
they would be less disadvantaged than with the EC tiered offer.  And, as they are often among the 
most efficient in Europe, they will be among the major beneficiaries from a deep CAP reform, as 
illustrated by the sugar case.  Some French farmers are beginning to realize this, and to wonder 
whether they should not support a swift CAP reform. 
Table 7.  Level of protection by EC Member state [a]
Member states
% index % index
Austria 59 103 22.9 98
Belgium 57 99 22.7 97
Britain 72 126 25.5 109
Czech Rep. 57 99 26.6 114
Denmark 54 94 26.1 112
Estonia 55 96 27.2 117
Finland 72 126 26.5 114
France 59 103 21.6 93
Germany 61 106 24.5 105
Greece 40 70 18.7 80
Hungary 44 77 23.5 101
Ireland 99 173 26.2 112
Italy 45 79 19.1 82
Latvia 59 103 25.3 108
Lithuania 62 108 26.6 114
Luxembourg 75 131 25.6 110
Malta 37 65 18.6 80
Netherlands 53 93 19.1 82
Poland 47 82 24.5 105
Portugal 43 75 18.3 78
Slovakia 54 94 25.2 108
Slovenia 57 99 21.2 91
Spain 43 75 19.1 82
Sweden 71 124 25.5 109
EC-15 55 96 21.9 94
EC-25 57 100 23.3 100
Sources: OCDE, WTO. Messerlin 2006.
[a] There is no available information on Cyprus' farm sector.
[b] PSE:Producer support equivalents in 2002, OCDE.
[c] Ad valorem tariffs in 2004 (specific tariffs excluded).
PSEs [b] Tariffs [c]
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Concluding Summary 
In the Doha negotiations on industrial goods (NAMA), the EC and the other advanced economies 
should (have) aim(ed) at achieving what the European business community is asking for – namely no 
single industrial tariff above 15 percent.  Such a target makes good economic sense for three reasons.  
Firstly, it would eliminate the tariff peaks that constitute the main obstacle faced by the world 
exporters, and that generate most of the protection costs imposed on the consumers in the rest of the 
world.  Secondly, it would vastly increase the certainty of access to the emerging countries’ markets 
for the world exporters – an outcome that negotiators undervalue heavily, while the business 
community is insisting on it.  Lastly, as this target does not impose a brutal liberalisation of the 
emerging countries, it should make easier to negotiate exceptions as simple and as predictable as 
possible, hence to generate a “clean” Doha Agreement. 
Focusing on the major emerging countries, the paper gives a concrete sense of the changes 
associated to the 15 percent target (using a base Swiss coefficient of 25) and to simple and 
predictable exceptions (using Swiss coefficients of 40 and 60).  The emerging countries would then 
exhibit average bound tariffs ranging from 6.7 to 14.7 percent, with a maximum bound tariff of 50 
percent (but only a tiny portion of the bound tariffs would be higher than 30 percent).  Their average 
bound tariffs would be cut by 4 to 22 percentage points, their maximum bound tariffs by 15 to 250 
percentage points.  More crucially for the economic welfare gains, their maximum applied tariffs would 
be cut by 8 to 165 percentage points.  If effective cuts in average applied tariffs are limited to three 
emerging countries, the average tariff water would be eliminated or reduced to a low level in all the 
others, revealing a huge increase in the level of certainty for the business community. 
The Doha negotiations in “agriculture” are dominated by two little known – but crucial – facts.  Firstly, 
the negotiations deal with many more agro-industrial (“food”) products than farm products.  Only a 
quarter of the tariff lines involved are farm products, all the others being food (semi-processed or 
processed) products.  Secondly, the tariff cuts offered by the current EC proposal (the most critical 
proposal in tariff matters) protect food producers more than farmers:  the post-Doha average tariffs 
would be 10.7 percent for farm products, compared to 16.9 percent for processed food, while the post-
Doha maximum tariffs would be 43.7 and 105.7 percent, respectively.  Last but not least, the EC food 
products that would remain the most protected items after the Doha Round would be a strange 
hodgepodge of waste products (dog and cat food, whey, etc.) goods with tiny potential in international 
trade (yoghurts) or with questionable importance (cucumbers, gherkins, etc.). 
In such a context, “rebalancing” the current EC tariff proposal – cutting more the high tariffs, cutting 
less the low tariffs – is an attractive alternative.  Firstly, cutting deeper into the high tariffs would 
deliver more economic welfare gains for the European consumers than the current EC proposal. 
Secondly, rebalancing would deliver political benefits.  For instance, a base Swiss coefficient of 60 
combined with a Swiss coefficient of 70 for the exceptions would offer the EC farmers a better “deal” 
than the current EC proposal since the average tariff on farm products would be reduced to 11.8 
percent, compared to 10.7 percent under the current offer.  Rebalancing would leave unchanged the 
average tariff of all the processed food products, but it would cut more deeply 222 food tariffs – on 
average, from 45.5 to 35 percent, but by more than 5 percent for only 87 tariffs, and by more than 10 
percent for only 46 tariffs (a dozen of which are various forms of whey).  Meanwhile, it would cut less 
deeply 847 food tariffs (from 11.4 to 13.1 percent on average).  As a result, a vast majority of EC food 
producers would support rebalancing, all the more if the other WTO Members liberalize their own food 
sectors. 
Combining the above outlines in NAMA and agriculture would fit the two key criteria imposed on the 
Doha Round.  The “less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments” condition would be ensured by 
the remaining notable differences between the bound and applied tariffs of the emerging countries and 
those of the advanced economies in NAMA.  The “comparably high level of ambition in market access 
for Agriculture and NAMA” criterion would be ensured by the fact that the maximum and average 
tariffs of the emerging countries in NAMA would be close to the maximum and average tariffs of the 
advanced economies in farm and food products. 
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There are other important aspects of the negotiations in trade in goods.  A key one is the treatment of 
the developing countries which cannot be classified as emerging economies or as least-developed 
economies.  As suggested before the 2003 Cancún WTO Ministerial, the best solution would be to 
modulate the tariff cuts suggested above in order to allow a liberalisation of these “in-between” 
developing countries that would be more progressive, hence in line with their governing capabilities.  
This suggestion stresses the crucial necessity to find, first and foremost, a compromise between the 
emerging and advanced WTO Members. 
All the above suggestions assume that the EC is ready to position itself as a WTO Member having a 
long term view of the world trade regime – looking far away being the mark of leadership.  They also 
implicitly assume that other Rounds will follow a successful Doha Round.  Those future Rounds will 
take over the unfinished business left by (perhaps) a more modest but “clean” (i.e., based on simple 
and predictable exceptions) Doha outcome much more easily that if they inherit a Doha package more 
ambitious for some products, but riddled with more distorsive exceptions on many more products.  In 
short, the EC long term interest is to promote the notion of a sequence of WTO Rounds of 
liberalisation as a patient “peeling of the protectionist onion” [Messerlin 2007a]. 
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